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Derivation of the Born Rule from
Operational Assumptions
Simon Saunders1
1 Introduction
Whence the Born rule? It is fundamental to quantum mechanics; it is the essen-
tial link between probability and a formalism which is otherwise deterministic; it
encapsulates the measurement postulates. Gleason’s theorem [4] is mathemati-
cally informative, but its premises are too strong to have any direct operational
meaning: here the Born rule is derived more simply, from purely operational
assumptions.
The argument we shall present is based on Deutsch’s derivation of the Born
rule from decision theory [2]. The latter was criticized by Barnum et al [1],
but their objections hinged on ambiguities in Deutsch’s notation that have re-
cently been resolved by Wallace [12]; here we follow Wallace’s formulation. The
argument is not quite the same as Wallace’s, however. Wallace draws heavily
on the Everett interpretation, as well as on decision theory; like Deutsch, he is
concerned with constraints on subjective probability, rather than any objective
counterpart to it. In contrast, the derivation of the Born rule that we shall
present is independent of decision theory, independent of the interpretation of
probability, and independent of any assumptions about the measuring process.
As such it applies to all the major foundational approaches to quantum me-
chanics.
We assume the conventional scheme for the description of experiments: an
initial state, measured observable, and set of macroscopic outcomes. Given a
description of this form, we assume there is a general algorithm for the expecta-
tion value of the observable outcomes (the Born rule is such an algorithm). The
argument then takes the following form: for a particular class of experiments
there are definite rules for determining such descriptions, based on simple opera-
tional rules, and theoretical assumptions that concern only the state-preparation
device, not the measurement device. These rules imply that in general such ex-
periments can be described in different ways. But the algorithm we are looking
for concerns the expectation value of the observed outcomes, so applied to these
different descriptions, it must yield the same expectation value. Constraints of
this form are in fact sufficient to force the Born rule. If there is to be such an
algorithm, then it is the Born rule.
1Contact: simon.saunders@linacre.ox.ac.uk, and http://users.ox.ac.uk/˜ppox/
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2 Multiple-Channel Experiments
The kinds of experiments we shall consider are limited in the following respects:
they are repeatable; there is a clear distinction between the state preparation
device and the detection and registration device; and - this the most important
limitation - we assume that for a given state-preparation device, preparing the
system to be measured in a definite initial state, the state can be resolved into
channels, each of which can be independently blocked, in such a way that when
only one channel is open the outcome of the experiment is deterministic - in the
sense that if there is any outcome at all (on repetition of the experiment) it is
always the same outcome. We further suppose that for every outcome there is
at least one channel for which it is deterministic, and - in order to associate a
definite initial state with a particular region of the apparatus - we suppose that
all the channels are recombined prior to the measurement process proper.
For an example of such an experiment that measures spin, consider a neutron
interferometer, where orthogonal states of spin (with respect to a given axis)
are produced by a beam-splitter, each propagating along different arms of
the interferometer, before being recombined prior to the measurement of that
component of spin. For an example that measures position, consider an optical
two-slit experiment, adapted so that the lensing system after the slits first brings
the light into coincidence, but then focuses it on detectors in such a way that
each can receive light from only one of the slits. It is not too hard to specify
an analogous procedure in the case of momentum;2 any number of familiar
experiments can be converted into an experiment of this kind.
We introduce the following notation. Let there be d channels in all, with
D ≤ d possible outcomes uj ∈ U , j = 1, ..., D. These outcomes are macroscopic
events (e.g. positions of pointers). Let M denote the experiment that is per-
formed when all the channels are open, and Mk, k = 1, ..., d the (deterministic)
experiment that is performed when only the kth channel is open. Let there be
identifiable regions r1, r2, ... of the state-preparation device through which the
system to be measured must pass (if it is to be subsequently detected at all
- regardless of which channels are open). Call an experiment satisfying these
specifications a multiple-channel experiment.
One could go further, and provide operational definitions of the initial states
in each case, but we are looking for a probability algorithm that can be applied
to states that are mathematically defined (so any operational definition of the
initial state would eventually have to be converted into a mathematical one):
we may as well work with the mathematical state from the beginning.
3 Models of Experiments
Turn now to the schematic, mathematical descriptions of experiments. Our
assumptions are conventional: we suppose that an experiment is designed to
2The conventional method for preparing a beam of charged partciles of definite momentum
(by selecting for deflection in a magnetic field) can be adapted quite simply.
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measure some observable X̂ on a complex Hilbert space H , which for conve-
nience we take to be of finite dimensionality;3 we suppose that the apparatus is
prepared in some initial state ψ, normalized to one,4 and that on measurement
one of a finite number of microscopic outcomes λk ∈ Sp(X̂) results, k = 1, ..., d
(we allow for repetitions, i.e. for some j 6= k we may have λj = λk).We suppose
that these microscopic events are amplified up to the macroscopic level by some
physical process Ω : Sp(X̂) → U, yielding one or other of the D possible dis-
played outcomes uj ∈ U. We suppose the latter macroscopic events occur with
probabilities pj , j = 1, .., D.
5
We take it that the details of the detection and amplification process are
what are disputed, not that there is such a process, nor that it results in macro-
scopic outcomes uj . The probabilities computed from records of repeated trials
concern in the first instance these registered, macroscopic outcomes, not the
unobservable microscopic events λk (indeed, on some approaches to founda-
tions, there are no probabilistic microscopic events, prior to amplification up
the macroscopic level). To keep this distinction firmly in mind - and the distinc-
tion between the sets U and R - we shall not assume (as is usual) the numer-
ical equality of Ω(λk) with λk; we do, however, assume that the macroscopic
outcomes uj ∈ U are physical numerals, so that addition and multiplication
operations can be defined on them. For convenience we assume that none of
these numerals is the zero.
Call the triple
〈
ψ, X̂,Ω
〉
an experimental model, denote g. This scheme
extends without any modification to experiments where there are inefficiencies
in the detection and registration devices, so long as they are the same for every
channel. (A more sophisticated scheme will be needed if the efficiencies differ
from one channel to the next, however; we neglect this complication here.)
This scheme applies to a much wider variety of experiments than multiple-
channel experiments; the Born rule is conventionally stated in just these terms.
We shall be interested in algorithms that assign real numbers to experimental
models, interpreted as expectation values, i.e. weighted averages of the quanti-
ties uj, with weights given by the probabilities pj of each uj , j = 1, ..., D. We
are therefore looking for a map V : g → R of the form:
V [ψ, X̂,Ω] =
D∑
j=1
pjuj,
D∑
j=1
pj = 1. (1)
If D = d we can write the uj’s directly in terms of the Ω(λk)’s. Otherwise
define λ−1(uj) = {k : Ω(λk) = uj}, j = 1, ..., D, and choose any real numbers
3It would be just as easy to work with Hilbert spaces of countably inifnite dimension,
and restrict instead the observables to self-adjoint operators with purely point spectra. (The
difficulty with observables with continuous spectra is purely technical, however.)
4Later on we shall consider the consequences of relaxing the normalization condition (cor-
respondingly, we use the term “state” loosely, to mean any Hilbert space vector defined up to
phase).
5In the case of the Everett interpretation, we say rather that all of the macroscopic out-
comes result, but that each of them is in a different branch (with a given amplitude). (We
will consider the interpretation of probabilty in the Everett interpretation in due course.)
3
wk ∈ [0, 1], k = 1, ..., d such that
∑
k∈λ−1(uj) wk = pj. From Eq.(1) we obtain:
V [ψ, X̂,Ω] =
d∑
k=1
wkΩ(λk),
d∑
k=1
wk = 1. (2)
Conversely, given any d real numbers wk ∈ [0, 1] satisfying Eq.(2), define the D
numbers pj =
∑
k∈λ−1(uj) wk; from Eq.(2) we obtain Eq.(1).
In what follows, we assume the existence of probabilities pj satisfying Eq.(1),
and therefore that there are real numbers wk satisfying Eq.(2). The latter will
prove more convenient for calculations.
4 The Consistency Condition
Our general strategy is as follows. In the special case of multiple-channel exper-
iments, there are clear criteria for when an experiment is to be assigned a given
model. There follows an important constraint on V : for if M is assigned two
distinct models g, g′, and if there is to be any general algorithm V : g → R, then
the expectation values it assigns to these two models had better agree, i.e. V (g)
= V (g′). We view this as a consistency condition on V. Failing this condition,
expectation values of models could have no unequivocal experimental meaning.
The probabilistic outcome events uk ∈ U that we are talking of are all observ-
able; it is the mean values of these that the quantities V (g) concern; if one and
the same mean value is matched to two expectation values, V (g) 6= V (g′), then
either the experiment cannot be modelled by g and g′, or there is no algorithm
V for mapping models to expectation values.
That a condition of this kind played a tacit role in Deutsch’s derivation
was recognized by Wallace; it was used explicitly in Wallace’s deduction [12] of
the Born rule, although there it was cast in a slightly different form, and the
conditions for its use were stated in terms of the Everett theory of measurement
(including the theory of the detection and registration process). Here we make
do with operational criteria, and with assumptions about the behavior of the
state prior to any detection events; we suppose that this prior evolution of the
state is purely deterministic, and governed by the unitary formalism of quantum
mechanics.6
Consider a multiple-channel experiment M. By assumption, there are d de-
terministic experiments Mk, k = 1, ..., d that can also be performed with this
apparatus, on blocking every channel save the kth, each yielding one of the D
macroscopic outcomes uj ∈ U . Given that the initial state in region r for Mk
is ϕk, it is clear enough, on operational grounds, as to what can be counted
as a model for this experiment: the experiment measures any X̂ such that
X̂ϕk = λkϕk, for any λk and any Ω such that Ω(λk) ∈ U is the outcome of Mk.
6Of course in its initial phases the process of state preparation will involve probabilistic
events, if only in collimating particles produced from the source, or in blocking particular
channels. But it does not matter what these probabilities are; all that matters is that if a
particle is located in a given region of the apparatus, then it is in a definite state, and unitarily
develops in a definite way (prior to any detection or registration process).
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Now consider the indeterministic experiment M with every channel open.
We suppose that the state of M at r is ψ =
∑d
k=1 ckϕk; then the observable
measured is any X̂ such that X̂ϕk = λkϕk for k = 1, ..., d, and any Ω such that
Ω(λk) ∈ U is the outcome of each Mk.
Let us state this as a definition:
Definition 1 LetM have d channels and D outcomes. ThenM realizes
〈
ψ, X̂,Ω
〉
if and only if
(i) for some region r and orthogonal states {ϕk}, ϕk is the state of Mk in
r, k = 1, ..., d ≥ D, and ψ =∑dk=1 ckϕk is the state of M in r,
(ii)X̂ϕk = λkϕk, k = 1, ..., d,
(iii) Ω(λk) is the outcome of Mk, k = 1, ..., d.
The definition applies equally to a deterministic experiment (the limiting case
in which d = D = 1). Bearing in mind that from our definition of multiple-
channel experiments, for each uj ∈ U , there is at least one Mk for which uj is
deterministic, it follows from (ii), (iii) that X̂ has at leastD distinct eigenvalues.
Why is it right to model experiments in this way and not some other? The
deterministic case speaks for itself; in the indeterministic case, the short an-
swer is that it is underwritten by the linearity of the equations of motion. An
apparatus that deterministically measures each eigenvalue λk of X̂, when the
state in a given region of the apparatus is ϕk, will indeterministically measure
the eigenvalues λk of X̂, when the state in that region is in a superposition of
the ϕk’s. This principle is implicit in standard laboratory procedures; this is
how measuring devices are standardly calibrated, and how their functioning is
checked.
The consistency condition now reads:
Definition 2 V is consistent if and only if V (g) = V (g′) whenever g and g′
can be realized by the same experiment.
In the deterministic case evidently:
V [ϕk, λkP̂ϕk,Ω] = Ω(λk). (3)
We will show that if |ψ| = 1 and V is consistent, with 〈, 〉 the inner product on
H , then7
V [ψ, X̂,Ω] =
〈
ψ,Ω(X̂)ψ
〉
(4)
Eq.(4) is the Born rule.
We begin with some simple consequences of the consistency condition. The
Born rule is then derived in stages: first for equal norms in the simplest possible
7Whilst Ω(X̂) makes no sense as an operator (as the values of Ω are physical numerals
like pointer-positions, not real numbers) we are assuming that arithmetic operations can be
defined for the Ω(λk)’s; define < ψ,Ω(λk)P̂ϕkψ > = Ω(λk) < ψ, P̂ϕkψ > accordingly, and
extend by linearity.
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case of a spin half system; then for the general case of equal norms; and then
for rational norms. The general case of irrational norms is handled by a simple
continuity condition. As promised, we shall also derive a probability rule for
initial states normalized to arbitrary finite numbers.
5 Consequences of the Consistency Condition
We prove four general constraints on V that follow from consistency. (Eqs.(5)-
(8) may be found in Wallace [12], derived on somewhat different assumptions.)
In each case an equality is derived from the fact that a single experiment
realizes two different models: by consistency, each must be assigned the same
expectation value.
We assume it is not in doubt that there do exist such experiments, in which
the initial state (prior to any detection or amplification process) evolves unitarily
in the manner stated.
Lemma 3 Let V be consistent. It follows
(i) for invertible f : R→ R:
V [ψ, X̂,Ω] = V [ψ, f(X̂),Ω ◦ f−1]. (5)
(ii) For orthogonal projectors {P̂k}, k = 1, .., d, such that P̂kϕj = δkjϕj
V [
d∑
k=1
ckϕk,
d∑
k=1
λkP̂ϕk ,Ω] = V [
d∑
k=1
ckϕk,
d∑
k=1
λkP̂k,Ω]. (6)
(iii) For Ûθ : ϕk → eiθkϕk, k = 1, ..., d, for arbitrary θk ∈ [0, 2π] ⊂ R
V [ψ,
d∑
k=1
λkP̂ϕk ,Ω] = V [Ûθψ,
d∑
k=1
λkP̂ϕk ,Ω]. (7)
(iv) For Ûpi : ϕk → ϕpi(k), where π is any permutation of < 1, ..., d >
V [ψ, X̂,Ω] = V [Ûpiψ, π
−1(X̂),Ω]. (8)
Proof. Let g =
〈
ψ, X̂,Ω
〉
be realized by M with d channels. Then for some
region r1 the state of Mk is ϕk, k = 1, .., d, that of M is
∑d
k=1 ckϕk, and there
exist (not necessarily distinct) real numbers λ1,...,λk such that X̂ϕk = λkϕk,
Ω({λk}) = U. Since for invertible f , Ω[f−1(f(λk)] = Ω(λk), f(X̂)ϕk = f(λk)ϕk,
M realizes
〈
ψ, f(X̂),Ω ◦ f−1
〉
, and (i) follows from consistency. Further, M re-
alizes any other model
〈
ψ, Ŷ ,Ω
〉
such that Ŷ ϕk = λkϕk;
∑d
k=1 λkP̂k is such
a Ŷ , so (ii) follows from consistency. Suppose now that ψ evolves unitarily to
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the state Ûθψ in region r2. Then in r2 the state of each Mk is e
iθkϕk, and since
P̂eiθkϕk = P̂ϕk , M realizes
〈
Ûθψ,
∑d
k=1 λkP̂ϕk ,Ω
〉
, and (iii) follows from consis-
tency. Finally, let ψ subsequently evolve to the state Ûpiψ in region r3. Then in
r3 the state of each Mk is ϕpi(k), and the state of M is
∑d
k=1 ckϕpi(k). Without
loss of generality, we may write X̂ as
∑d
k=1 λk P̂ϕk ; then π
−1(X̂) =
∑d
k=1 λk
P̂ϕpi(k) satisfies π
−1(X̂)ϕpi(k) = λkϕpi(k), so M realizes
〈
Ûpiψ, π
−1(X̂),Ω
〉
, and
(iv) follows from consistency
Eqs.(5)-(8) are of course trivial consequences of the Born rule, Eq.(4). Note
further that in each case the observables whose expectation values are identified
commute - these are constraints among probability assignments to projectors
belonging to a single resolution of the identity. Finally, note that the normal-
ization of the initial state ψ played no role in the proofs.
6 Case 1: The Stern-Gerlach Experiment for
Equal Norms
Consider the Stern-Gerlach experiment with d = D = 2. Let X̂ = 12 P̂+− 12 P̂− =
σ̂z (in conventional notation), the observable for the z-component of spin with
eigenstates ϕ±, and let ψ = c+ϕ+ + c−ϕ−. Let Ûpi interchange ϕ+ and ϕ−, so
Ûpiσ̂zÛ
−1
pi = −σ̂z. From Lemma 3(iv) it follows that:
V [c+ϕ+ + c−ϕ−, σ̂z,Ω] = V [c+ϕ− + c−ϕ+,−σ̂z ,Ω]. (9)
From Eq.(9) and Lemma 3(i):
V [c+ϕ+ + c−ϕ−, σ̂z ,Ω] = V [c+ϕ− + c−ϕ+, σ̂z,Ω ◦ −I] (10)
(where (Ω ◦ −I)(x) = Ω(−x)). From Eq.(10), in the special case that |c+|2 =
|c−|2, and using Lemma 3(iii) to compensate for any differences in phase:
V [c+ϕ+ + c−ϕ−, σ̂z,Ω] = V [c+ϕ+ + c−ϕ−, σ̂z,Ω ◦ −I]. (11)
Consider the LHS of this equality. From Eq.(2), writing w1 = w, w2 = 1 − w,
Ω(± 12 ) = Ω(±) - so that Ω(+) results with probability w, and Ω(−) results with
probability 1−w) - we obtain the expectation value x = wΩ(+)+ (1−w)Ω(−).
But by similar reasoning, the RHS yields wΩ(−)+ (1−w)Ω(+) = −x+Ω(+)+
Ω(−). Equating the two, x = 12 [Ω(+) + Ω(−)].
We have shown, for |c+|2 = |c−|2 :
V [c+ϕ+ + c−ϕ−, σ̂z,Ω] =
1
2
Ω(+) +
1
2
Ω(−) (12)
in accordance with the Born rule. Note that here we have derived an expectation
values in a situation (dimension 2) where Gleason’s theorem does not apply.
(Note that the normalization of the initial state ψ is again irrelevant to the
result.)
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7 Case 2: General Superpositions of Equal Norms
Consider an arbitrary observable on any d−dimensional subspace Hd of Hilbert
space. By the spectral theorem, we may write X̂ =
∑d
k=1 λkP̂ϕk , for some
set of orthogonal vectors {ϕk}, k = 1, ..., d spanning Hd, where there may be
repetitions among the λk’s. Let ψ be a (not-necessarily normalized) vector in
Hd; then for some d-tuple of complex numbers < c1, ..., cd >, ψ =
∑d
k=1 ckϕk.
For any permutation π, we have from Lemma 3(iv), (i):
V [
d∑
k=1
ckϕk, X̂,Ω] = V [
d∑
k=1
ckϕpi(k), π
−1(X̂),Ω] = V [
d∑
k=1
ckϕpi(k), X̂,Ω◦π]. (13)
If |ck|2 = |cj |2, j, k = 1, ..., d, using Lemma 3(iii) as before to adjust for any
phase differences
V [ψ, X̂,Ω] = V [ψ, X̂,Ω ◦ π]. (14)
Let < w1, ..., wd > be a d-tuple of non-negative real numbers satisfying Eq.(2).
From Eq.(14):
d∑
k=1
wkΩ(λk) =
d∑
k=1
wkΩ(λpi(k)). (15)
Eq.(15) holds for any permutation; let π interchange j and k, and otherwise act
as the identity. There follows
wjΩ(λj) + wkΩ(λk) = wkΩ(λj) + wjΩ(λk). (16)
Conclude that if Ω(λj) 6= Ω(λk) then wk = wj (recall that by convention 0 /∈ U ,
so Ω(λk) is never zero).
If D = d, evidently wk = wj for all j,k = 1, ..., d. Since
∑d
k wk = 1, wk =
1
d ,
k = 1, ..., d. Therefore
V [ψ, X̂,Ω] =
1
d
[
d∑
k=1
Ω(λk). (17)
If not, suppose Ω(λj) = Ω(λk) for j, k = 1, ..., b < d. (If b = d Eq.(17) follows
trivially.) For any j, k such that b < j ≤ d, k ≤ b, Ω(λk) 6= Ω(λj), from
which we conclude as before that wk = wj . Note further that under the stated
conditions, 1/d = |ck|2(
∑d
j=1 |cj |2)−1. We have proved
Theorem 4 Let ψ =
∑d
k=1 ckϕk, where |ck|2 = |cj |2 for all j, k = 1, ..., d. Then
if V is consistent
V [
d∑
k=1
ckϕk,
d∑
k=1
λkΩϕk ,Ω] =
d∑
k=1
|ck|2∑d
j=1 |cj |2
Ω(λk). (18)
Like Lemma 3, Theorem 4 is independent of the normalization of ψ.
8 Case 3: d=2 Normalized Superpositions with
Rational Norms
The idea for extending these methods to treat the case of unequal but rational
norms is as follows: consider an experiment in which the initial state ψ evolves
deterministically so that each component ϕk entering into the initial superpo-
sition with amplitude ck evolves into a superposition of zk orthogonal states of
equal norm 1/
√
zk, such that |ck/√zk!2 is constant for all k. One can then show
that the experiment has a model in which the initial state is a superposition of
states of equal norms, so Theorem 4 can be applied. (Evidently for this to work
each |ck|2 will have to be a rational number.)
For simplicity, consider first the case d = 2 for real amplitudes. Let ψ =√
m√
m+n
ϕ1 +
√
n√
m+n
ϕ2, where m and n are integers. Let X̂ = λ1P̂ϕ1 +λ2P̂ϕ2 . We
will show that if V is consistent, V [ψ, X̂,Ω] = mm+nΩ(λ1) +
n
m+nΩ(λ2).Let the
deterministic experiments of M be M1,M2, with registered outcomes Ω(λ1),
Ω(λ2) respectively. Let the initial states of M, M1,M2 in region r1 be ψ,
ϕ1, ϕ2 respectively. Then M realizes g1 =
〈
ψ, X̂,Ω
〉
. Now let ψ evolve to
Ûψ in region r2, where Ûϕ1 =
1√
m
∑m
k=1 χk, Ûϕ2 =
1√
n
∑n+m
k=m+1 χk, for some
orthogonal set of vectors {χk}, k = 1, ...,m + n. Denote λ1P̂Ûϕ1 + λ2P̂Ûϕ2 by
Ŷ . Then the initial state of Mi, i = 1, 2 is Ûϕi in r2, whilst that of M is
c1Ûϕ1 + c2Ûϕ2 in r2; since Ŷ Ûϕi = λiÛϕi it follows that M realizes g2 =〈
Ûψ, Ŷ ,Ω
〉
. By consistency, V (g1) = V (g2). Now define P̂1 = λ1
∑m
k=1 P̂χk ,
P̂2 = λ2
∑n+m
k=m+1 P̂χk ; since P̂kÛϕj = δkj Ûϕj , k, j = 1, 2, by Lemma 3(ii) it
follows V [Ûψ, Ŷ ,Ω] = V [Ûψ, λ1P̂1 + λ2P̂2,Ω]. But Ûψ =
1√
m+n
∑n+m
k=1 χk ;
applying Theorem 4 for d = m+n, and noting that Ω(λk) = λ1 for k = 1, ...,m,
and λ2 otherwise, the result follows.
9 Case 4: General Superpositions with Rational
Norms
The argument just given assumed ψ was normalized to one. The standard
rational for this is of course based on the probabilistic interpretation of the state,
and hence, at least tacitly, on the Born rule. It may be objected that we are
only able to derive the dependence of the expectation value on the squares of the
norms of the initial state, because this is put in by hand from the beginning. But
this suspicion is unfounded. Suppose, indeed, only that |c1|
2
|c2|2 =
m
n . As before,
define Ûϕ1 =
1√
m
∑m
k=1 χk, Ûϕ2 =
1√
n
∑n+m
k=m+1 χk.The state Ûψ in region r2
will have whatever normalization ψ had in r1; the states Ûϕi i = 1, 2 will be
eigenstates of P̂i, as before; Definition 1,2 will apply as before. Conclude that if
V is consistent, V [ψ, X̂,Ω] = V [Ûψ, λ1P̂1+λ2P̂2,Ω], as before. The difference is
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that now Ûψ = c1√
m
∑m
k=1 χk +
c2√
n
∑n+m
k=m χk =
c1√
m
∑n+m
k=1 χk =
c2√
n
∑n+m
k=1 χk
(adjusting the phases of c1 and c2 , using Lemma 3(ii), as required). Evidently
we have an initial state which is a superposition of n+m components of equal
norm, m of which yield outcome Ω(λ1) and n of which yield outcome Ω(λ2).
Since mn+m =
|c1|2
|c1|2+|c2|2 ,
n
n+m =
|c2|2
|c1|2+|c2|2
V [ψ, λ1P̂ϕ1 + λ2P̂ϕ2 ,Ω] =
|c1|2
|c1|2 + |c2|2 [Ω(λ1)] +
|c2|2
|c1|2 + |c2|2 [Ω(λ2)]. (19)
Evidently the normalization of ψ is irrelevant.
This result is worth proving in full generality:
Theorem 5 For each i, j = 1, ..., d let ci ∈ C satisfy |ci| > 0, |ci|
2
|cj|2 ∈ Z. Then
V [
d∑
k=1
ckϕk,
d∑
k=1
λkP̂ϕk ,Ω] =
d∑
k=1
|ck|2∑d
j=1 |cj |2
Ω(λk). (20)
Proof. For {ck} as stated, there exists c ∈ C, zk ∈ Z, θk ∈ [0, 2π], k = 1, .., d
such that ck = ce
iθk
√
zk. Let mk, n be integers such that zk =
mk
n , k = 1, ..., d;
let {χj}, j = 1, ..., s be an orthonormal basis on an s−dimensional subspace of
Hilbert space Hs, where s =
∑d
s=1ms (we may suppose for j = 1, ..., d, χj =
ϕj). Define Û on H
s by the action Ûϕk =
1√
mk
∑mk+1
j=mk+1
χj; let P̂k = P̂Ûϕk
,
k = 1, ..., d. Let ψ =
∑d
k=1 ckϕk; let M realize g1 =
〈
ψ,
∑d
k=1 λkP̂ϕk ,Ω
〉
; then
for some region r1, the initial state of M is ψ and the state of each Mk is ϕk
with outcome Ω(λk). Let the state of M at r2 be Ûψ; then M also realizes g2 =〈
Ûψ,
∑d
k=1 λkP̂k,Ω
〉
, and by consistency V (g1) = V (g2). But by construction
Ûψ =
d∑
k=1
ckÛϕk =
d∑
k=1
ck√
mk
mk+1∑
j=mk+1
χj =
d∑
k=1
ceiθk
n
mk+1∑
j=mk+1
χj (21)
so V [Ûψ,
∑d
k=1 λk
∑mk+1
s=mk+1
P̂χs ,Ω] = V [
c
n
∑s
k=1 χs,
∑d
k=1 λk
∑mk+1
s=mk+1
P̂χsΩ]
(by Lemma 3(ii)). The result follows from Theorem 4 (of s equiprobable out-
comes, mk have outcome Ω(λk), so V (g) =
1
s
∑d
k=1mkΩ(λk). But mk/s =
mk(
∑d
j=1mj)
−1 = zk(
∑d
j=1 zj)
−1 = |ck|2
∑d
j=1 |cj |2)−1)
Examination of the proof shows that the dependence of probabilities on
the modulus square of the expansion coefficients of the state ultimately de-
rives from the fact that we are concerned with unitary evolutions on Hilbert
space, specifically an inner-product space, and not some general normed lin-
ear topological space. A general class of norms on the latter is of the form
‖x‖ =
(∑d
k=1 |ξk|p
)1/p
, 1 ≤ p < ∞ (d may also be taken as infinite). Such
spaces (lp spaces) are metric spaces and can be completed in norm. The proof
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as we have developed it would apply equally to a theory of unitary (i.e. invertible
norm-preserving) motions on such a space, yielding the probability rule
V [
d∑
k=1
ckϕk,
d∑
k=1
λkP̂ϕk ,Ω] =
d∑
k=1
|ck|p∑d
j=1 |cj |p
Ω(λk) (22)
(assuming that |ci|
p
|cj |p ∈ Z, j, k = 1, ..., d). But the only space of this form which
is an inner-product space is p = 2 (Hilbert space).
10 Case 5: Arbitrary States
There are a variety of possible strategies for the treatment of irrational norms,
but the one that is most natural, given that we are making use of operational
criteria for the interpretation of experiments, is to weaken these criteria in the
light of the limitations of realistic experiments. In practise, one would not ex-
pect precisely the same state to be prepared on each run of the experiment.
Properly speaking, the statistics actually obtained will be those for an ensem-
ble of experiments; correspondingly, they should be obtained from a family of
models, differing slightly in their initial states. We should therefore speak of
approximate models (or of models that are approximately realized) - where the
differences among the models are small.
How small is small? What is the topology on the space of states? The
obvious answer, from a theoretical point of view, is the norm topology. We
should suppose that for sufficiently small ǫ, so long as |ψ − ψ′| < ǫ, then if〈
ψ, X̂,Ω
〉
is an approximate model for M then so is
〈
ψ′, X̂,Ω
〉
. Indeed, X̂
and Ω will likewise be subject to small variations. (Only the outcome set U
can be regarded as precisely specified, insofar as outcomes are identified with
numerals.)
But now it is clear that the details are hardly important; any algorithm that
applies to families of models of this type, yielding expectation values, will have
to be continuous in the norm topology. Given that, the extension of Theorem
5 to the irrational case is trivial. We define:
Definition 6 Let g(i) be any sequence of models
〈
ψ(i), X̂,Ω
〉
, i = 1, 2, ...such
that lim
i→∞
|ψ(i) − ψ| = 0. Then V is continuous in norm if lim
i→∞
V ( g(i)) = V (g).
We may finally prove:
Theorem 7 Let V be consistent and continuous in norm. Then for any model〈
ψ, X̂,Ω
〉
V [ψ, X̂,Ω] =
〈
ψ,Ω(X̂)ψ
〉
〈ψ, ψ〉 . (23)
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Proof. It is enough to prove that any realizable model satisfies Eq.(22). If
realizable, there is some multiple-channel experiment M with d channels and
D outcomes that realizes
〈
ψ, X̂,Ω
〉
. Let {ϕk}, k = 1, .., d be any orthog-
onal family of vectors such that X̂ϕk = λkϕk (not all the λk’s need be dis-
tinct). Without loss of generality, let ψ =
∑d
k=1 ckϕk, X̂ =
∑d
k=1 λkP̂ϕk . Let
0 < ǫ =
∑d
k=1 |ck|2 and let {c(i)k } ⊑ Cd be any sequence of d-tuples such that
ǫ ≤∑dk=1 |c(i)k |2, |c
(i)
j
|2
|c(i)
k
|2 ⊂ Z, limi→∞c
(i)
k = ck (such a sequence can always be found).
Let ψ(i) =
∑d
k=1 c
(i)
k ϕk, g
(i) =
〈
ψ(i), X̂,Ω
〉
. By Theorem 5, V [ψ(i), X̂,Ω] =
∑d
k=1
|c(i)
k
|2∑
d
j=1 |c(i)j |2
Ω(λk) =
1∑
d
j=1 |c(i)j |2
∑d
k=1 Ω(λk)
〈
ψ(i), P̂ϕkψ
(i)
〉
. The numer-
ator is
〈
ψ(i),
∑d
k=1 Ω(λk)P̂ϕk)ψ
(i)
〉
(by the continuity of the inner product),
i.e.
〈
ψ(i),Ω(X̂)ψ(i)
〉
; since the denominator is bounded below by ǫ > 0, with
lim
i→∞
∑d
j=1 |c(i)j |2 =
∑d
j=1 |cj |2, and since limi→∞
〈
ψ(i),Ω(X̂)ψ(i)
〉
=
〈
ψ,Ω(X̂)ψ
〉
(again by the continuity of the inner product), the result follows from the con-
tinuity of V
A similar proof can be given for a general probability rule on lp spaces, p 6= 2
(i.e. Eq.(22), for arbitrary complex coefficients; of course this result could not
be expressed as in Eq.(23), using an inner product).
Is a continuity assumption permitted in the present context? Gleason’s
theorem does not require it; if one is going to do better than Gleason’s theorem,
it would be pleasant to derive the continuity of the probability measure, rather
than to assume it. But from an operational point of view continuity is a very
natural assumption: no algorithm that could ever be used is going to distinguish
between states that differ infinitesimally.
11 A Role for Decision Theory
Deutsch [2] took a rather different view: he was at pains to establish the Born
rule for irrational norms, without assuming continuity. His method, however,
was far from operational: along with axioms of decision theory, he assumed that
quantum mechanics is true (under the Everett interpretation).
A hybrid is possible: the present method can in fact be supplemented with
axioms of decision theory, yielding the Born rule for irrational norms, without
any continuity assumption. But as Wallace [12] makes clear, nothing much
hangs on this question. One can do without a continuity assumption, but there
are just as good reasons to invoke it from a decision theoretic point of view
as from an operational one. In neither case is there any reason to distinguish
between states that differ infinitesimally.
Decision theory is important for a rather different reason: it is because
the non-probabilistic parts of decision theory (as Deutsch puts it), or decision
theory in the face of uncertainty (as Wallace puts it) can provide an account of
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probability in terms of something else. This matters in the case of the Everett
interpretation; according to many, the Everett interpretation has no place for
probability [7]; given Everett, probability cannot be taken as primitive.
So it is clear why Deutsch took the more austere line: if Everett is to be
believed, quantum mechanics is purely deterministic. Deutsch supposed that
the fundamental concept (that can be taken as primitive) is rather the value or
the utility that an agent places upon a model - that V (g) is in fact a utility.
He argued that experiments should be thought of as games; for each registered
outcome in U, we are to associate some utility, fixed in advance. So, in effect,
the mapping Ω : λk → Ω(λk) ∈ U defines the payoff for the outcome λk.
Decision theory on this approach has a substantial role. If we suppose that
the utilities of a rational agent are ordered, and satisfy very general assumptions
(“axioms of rationality”), a representation theorem can be derived [10] which
defines subjective probability in terms of the ordering of an agent’s utilities. In
effect, one deduces - in accordance with these axioms - that the agent acts as
if she places such-and-such subjective probabilities on the outcomes of various
actions.8
It is important that one can still make sense of uncertainty in this context,
as Wallace explains. It may be we cannot help ourselves to probabilistic ideas ab
initio, but that does not mean that one only deals with certainties - that games,
in some sense, have only a single payoff, as Deutsch at one point suggests [2,
p.3132-3.] From a first-person perspective, one does not know what outcome of a
quantum game to expect to observe (there is certainly no first-person perspective
from which they can all be observed). In fact, it is enough that - in the face of
branching - a rational agent expects anything at all (that she does not expect
oblivion [9]).
On this line of thought, the proofs of the Born rule just presented make
an illegitimate assumption: Eq.(1). We are not entitled to assume that the
macroscopic outcomes uj ∈ U, j = 1, ..., D occur with probabilities pj , for
they all occur; so neither can we assume there are non-negative real numbers,
summing to one, satisfying Eq.(2). But the proof of Theorem 4 (hence 5 and 7)
depended on this assumption. Of course we may, with Deutsch and Wallace,
eventually be in a position to make statements about the subjective probabilities
of branches, but if so such statements will have to come at a later stage - after
establishing the values V (g) of various games. But then how are we to establish
these values?
HereWallace has provided a considerably more detailed analysis than Deutsch,
and from weaker premises. But the proofs are correspondingly more compli-
8This does not mean that subjective probabilities are illusory, and correspond to nothing in
reality. The point is to legitimate the concept, not to abolish it. As for its objective correlate,
the most popular candidate has long been relative frequency (of outcomes in a sequence of
trials). Relative frequencies are obviously important when it comes to evidence for proba-
bilities, but there are well-known difficulties with trying to identify them with probabilities
(for anything short of infinite sequences). We read Everett as making a contrary proposal:
that the objective correlates of subjective probability are branches in the universal state (with
respect to the decoherence basis). Here we are deducing the quantitative rule to be used in
assigning subjective probabilities to branches.
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cated; for the sake of simplicity we shall only consider Deutsch’s argument,
removing the ambiguities of notation in the way shown by Wallace.
First, consider Case 1, the Stern-Gerlach experiment. All is in order up to
Eq.(11), but we must do without the assumption subsequently made - that the
registered outcome Ω(+) results with probability w, and outcome Ω(−) with
probability 1−w. Here Deutsch invokes a new principle, what he calls the zero-
sum rule:
V [ϕ, X̂,Ω] = −V [ϕ, X̂,−Ω]. (24)
Following Deutsch, let us assume that the numerical value of the utility Ω(λk)
equals λk. Then, in the special case where λ1 = −λ2 (true for the measurement
of a component of spin), from Eq.(24), applied to Eq.(11), we deduce:
V [c1ϕ1 + c2ϕ2, σ̂z,Ω] = −V [c1ϕ1 + c2ϕ2, σ̂z,Ω] (25)
and hence that V [c1ϕ1 + c2ϕ2, σ̂z ,Ω] = 0, in accordance with the Born rule in
this special case.
Although evidently of limited generality, the result is illustrative - assuming
the zero-sum rule can be independently justified. (Of course it follows trivially
from Eq.(2), but this was derived from Eq.(1), and at this point we cannot
make use of the concept of probability.) Here is an argument: banking too
is a form of gambling; the only difference between acting as the gambler who
bets, and as the banker who accepts the bet, is that whereas the gambler pays
a stake in order to play, and receives payoffs according to the outcomes, the
banker receives the stake in order to play, and pays the payoffs according to
the outcomes. The zero-sum rule is the statement that the most that one will
pay in the hope of gaining a utility is the least that one will accept to take the
risk of losing it. We may take it that this principle, as a principle of zero-sum
games, is perfectly secure. And evidently any quantum experiment can be used
to play a zero-sum game; therefore this principle also applies to the expected
utility of experiments.
What of the general equal-norm case, Case 2? Here the zero-sum rule is not
enough. But if we consider only the case d = 2, it is enough to supplement
it with another rule, what Deutsch calls the additivity rule. A payoff function
Ω : R → U is additive if and only if Ω(x + y) = Ω(x) + Ω(y). Let fk : R → R
be the function fk(x) = x+ k; then V is additive if and only if
V [ψ, X̂,Ω ◦ fk] = V [ψ, X̂,Ω] + Ω(k). (26)
Additivity of the payoff function is a standard assumption of elementary decision
theory, eminently valid for small bets (but hardly valid for large ones, or for
utilities that only work in tandem). Additivity of V then has a clear rational:
it is an example of a sure-thing principle, that if, given two games, each exactly
the same, except that in one of them one receives an additional utility Ω(k)
whatever the outcome, then one should value that game as having an additional
utility Ω(k).
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To see how additivity can be used in Case 2 (but restricted to d = 2), observe
that for k = −λ1 − λ2, the function −I ◦ fk is the permutation π. Therefore
from Eq.(14) we may conclude:
V [ψ, X̂,Ω] = V [ψ, X̂,Ω ◦ −I ◦ fk]. (27)
By additivity the RHS is V [ψ, X̂,Ω ◦−I] + (Ω ◦−I)(k), and since Ω is additive
(so Ω ◦ −I = −Ω) we obtain, from the zero-sum rule
V [ψ, X̂,Ω] = −V [ψ, X̂,Ω]− Ω(k). (28)
With a further application of payoff additivity there follows
V [ψ, X̂,Ω] =
1
2
[Ω(λ1) + Ω(λ2)] (29)
in accordance with the Born rule.
As Wallace has shown, this, along with the higher dimensional cases (d > 2),
can be derived from much weaker axioms of decision theory, that do not assume
additivity. Theorem 5 then goes through unchanged.9 As already remarked,
one is then in a position to derive the extension to the irrational case without
assuming continuity: for the details, I refer to Wallace [12].
Decision theory can evidently play a role in the derivation of the Born rule,
but it is only needed if the notion of probability is itself in need of justification.
That may well be so, in the context of the Everett interpretation; but on other
approaches to quantum mechanics, probability, whatever it is, can be taken as
given.
12 Gleason’s Theorem
Compare Gleason’s theorem:
Theorem 8 Let f be any function from 1-dimensional projections on a Hilbert
space of dimension d > 2 to the unit interval, such that for each resolution of
the identity {P̂k}, k = 1, ..., d,
∑d
k=1 P̂k = I,
∑d
k=1 f(P̂k) = 1. Then there exists
a unique density matrix ρ such that f(P̂k) = Tr(ρP̂k).
Proof. Gleason (1967)
A first point is that the derivation of the Born rule presented here concerns
the notion of a fixed algorithm that applies to arbitrary measurement mod-
els, hence to Hilbert spaces of arbitrary dimension, whereas Gleason’s theorem
concerns an algorithm that applies to arbitrary resolutions of the identity on a
Hilbert space of fixed dimension. Although the proof of Theorems 5 and 7 made
9It is worth remarking that a derivation of the Born rule for initial states that are not
normalized to unity is just what is needed for the Everett interpretation, as also the de
Broglie-Bohm theory (in reality, according to either approach, one always deals with branch
amplitudes with modulus strictly less than one - supposing the initial state of the universe
has modulus one).
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use of a Hilbert space of large dimensionality, it applies to the 2-dimensional
case as well.
More important, on a variety of approaches to quantum mechanics, nothing
so strong as Gleason’s premise is really motivated. It is not required that prob-
abilities can be defined for a projector independent of the family of projectors
of which it is a member. This requirement, sometimes called non-contextuality
[8], is very strong. Very few approaches to quantum mechanics subscribe to it.
The theorem has no relevance to any approach that singles out a unique basis
once and for all: it applies neither to the GRW theory [5], nor to the de Broglie-
Bohm theory [6], which single out the position basis; it does not apply to the
Everett interpretation [?], which singles out a basis approximately localized in
phase space; it does not apply to the consistent histories approach [3], assum-
ing the choice of decoherent history space is unique. All these theories require
only that probabilities be defined for projectors associated with the preferred
basis - if they apply to any other resolution of the identity, it is insofar as in
a particular context, experimental or otherwise, the latter projections become
correlated with members of the former family.
But so much is entirely compatible with the derivation that we have offered.
By all means restrict Definition 1 to observables compatible with a unique res-
olution of the identity (and likewise the consistency condition of Definition 2).
Lemma 3 proves identities for expectation values for commuting observables, it
likewise can be restricted to a unique resolution of the identity; likewise Theo-
rem 4. In Theorem 5 an auxiliary basis was used, but again this can again be
taken as the preferred basis. And whilst it is In the spirit of Theorem 7 that
probabilities should also be defined for small variations in projectors, this does
not yet amount to the assumption of non-contextuality.
Unlike the premise of Gleason’s theorem, the operational criteria that we
have used are hardly disputed; they are common ground to all the major schools
of foundations of quantum mechanics. But it would be wrong to suggest that
they apply to all of them equally: on some approaches - in particular, those that
provide a detailed dynamical model of measurements - there is good reason to
suppose that an algorithm for expectation values will depend on additional
factors (in particular, on the state at the instant of state reduction); the Born
rule may no longer be forced in consequence. (But we take it that this would
be an unwelcome consequence of these approaches; the Born rule will have to
be otherwise justified - presumably, as it is in the GRW theory, as a hypothesis).
Of the major schools, two - the Everett interpretation, and those based
on operational assumptions (here we include the Copenhagen interpretation)
- offer no such resources. This point is clear enough in the latter case; in
the case of the Everett interpretation, the association of models with multiple
channel experiments as given in Definition 1 follows from the full theory of
measurement.10 Quantum mechanics under the Everett interpretation provides
no leeway in this matter. The same is likely to be true of any approach to
10For arguments in the still more general case, on applying the Everett theory of measure-
ment to any experiment, I refer to Wallace [12] (see in particular his principle of “measurement
neutrality”).
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quantum mechanics that preserves the unitary formalism intact, without any
supplement to it.
The principal remaining schools have a rather different status. One, the
state-reduction approach, has already been remarked on: a new and detailed
dynamical theory of measurement is likely to offer novel definitions of experi-
mental models and novel criteria for when they are to be applied. The other is
the hidden-variable approach, in which the state evolves unitarily even during
measurements (but is incomplete). This case deserves special consideration.
13 Completeness
As it happens, the one approach to foundations in which the Born rule has been
seriously questioned is an example of this type (the de Broglie-Bohm theory)[11].
Hidden variables certainly make a difference to the argument we have presented.
Consider the proof of Theorem 4. The passage from Eq.(13) to Eq.(14) hinged
on the fact that the state on both sides of Eq.(13) is identical when the norms of
its components are the same. (Likewise the step from Eq.(10) to (11).) But if
the state is incomplete, this is not enough to ensure the required identification.
Including the state of the hidden variables as well (denote w), we should replace
ψ by the pair < ψ, ω > (w may be the value of the hidden variable, or a
probability distribution over its values). Doing this, as Wallace has pointed
out [12], there is no guarantee that in the case of superpositions of equal norms
- e.g. for ψ = 1√
2
(ϕ1 + ϕ2), where ϕ1, ϕ2 are, as in Case 1, eigenstates of the
z−component of spin - that Ûpi (permuting ϕ1 and ϕ2) will act as the identity.
Although Ûpiψ = ψ, its action on < ψ, ω > may well be different from the
identity; how is the permutation to act on the hidden variables?
The question is clearer when Ûpi implements a spatial transformation. We
have an example where it does: the Stern-Gerlach experiment. In this case
Ûpiσ̂zÛ
−1
pi = −σ̂z, a reflection in the x − y plane. Under the latter, a particle
initially with positive z-coordinate (ω = +) is mapped to one with negative
z-coordinate (ω = −). Under this same transformation, the superposition ψ =
1√
2
(ϕ1 + ϕ2) is unchanged. Therefore Ûpi :< ψ,+ >→< ψ,− > 6=< ψ,+ >;
there is no longer any reason to suppose that Eq.(11) will be satisfied.
This situation is entirely as expected. In the de Broglie-Bohm theory, given
such an initial state ψ, it is well known that if the incident particle is located
on one side of the plane of symmetry of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus, then it
will always remain there. It is obvious that if the particles is always located on
the same side of this plane, on repetition of the experiment, the statistics of the
outcomes will disagree with the Born rule. It is equally clear that if particles are
randomly distributed about this plane of symmetry then the Born rule will be
obeyed - but that is only to say that the probability distribution for the hidden
variables is determined by the state, in accordance with the Born rule. This is
what we are trying to prove.
But it does not follow that the arguments we have given have no bearing on
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such a theory. Our strategy, recall, was to derive constraints on an algorithm -
any algorithm - that takes as inputs experimental models and yields as outputs
expectation values. The constraints will apply even if the state is incomplete,
even if there are additional parameters controlling individual measurement out-
comes - so long as the state alone determines the statistical distribution of the
hidden variables. Given that, then any symmetries of the state will also be
symmetries of the distribution of hidden variables. In application to the de
Broglie-Bohm theory, our result indeed implies that the particle distribution
must be given by the Born rule - this is no longer an additional postulate of
the theory - so long as the particle distribution is determined only by the state.
The assumption is not that particles must be distributed in accordance with the
Born rule, but that they are distributed by any rule at all that is determined
by the state. Then it is the Born rule.
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